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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I. DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEYS' NEGLECT OF CLIENTS' AFFAIRS
AND FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH GRIEVANCE BOARD
In In re Bruner1 and In re Haddock2 the South Carolina
Supreme Court repeated its warning that the court will impose
an appropriate sanction for an attorney's inattentiveness and de-
lay in handling a client's legal affairs. This neglect constitutes a
violation of the South Carolina Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.3 The court indicated in both cases that an attorney's fail-
ure to cooperate fully during Board of Grievances' investigations
constitutes additional misconduct to be considered in determin-
ing proper disciplinary action.4 Finding that Bruner and Had-
dock engaged in both types of misconduct, the court publicly
reprimanded each respondent.5
The neglect charge in In re Bruner stemmed from a real
1. 283 S.C. 114, 321 S.E.2d 600 (1984).
2. 283 S.C. 116, 321 S.E.2d 601 (1984).
3. DR 6-101 (Supp. 1984) provides in relevant part-
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 6-101 (Supp. 1984).
4. The obligation to cooperate with the Board arises as a result of its members'
status as officers of the supreme court appointed to investigate complaints of profes-
sional misconduct. 283 S.C. at 116, 321 S.E.2d at 601. The supreme court, therefore,
regards failure to respond to the Board's inquiries as the equivalent of refusal to respond
to the court. In re Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 517, 290 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1982). For a discussion
of how an attorney's failure to cooperate with the Board's inquiries affects disciplinary
sanctions imposed, see Annot., 96 A.L.R.2D 823, 851 (1964).
5. In cases of an attorney's negligence in handling clients' affairs, the court has im-
posed various sanctions, depending on the degree of culpability and wilfulness of the
attorney's conduct. In cases of simple negligence, the court has publicly reprimanded the
attorney. See, e.g., In re Hodge, 277 S.C. 507, 290 S.E.2d 237 (1982); In re Davis, 276
S.C. 532, 280 S.E.2d 644 (1981); In re Kitts, 276 S.C. 242, 277 S.E.2d 602 (1981). In other
cases, the court has imposed indefinite suspension. See, e.g., In re Treacy, 277 S.C. 514,
290 S.E.2d 240 (1982); In re Wooten, 260 S.C. 12, 193 S.E.2d 808 (1973). The court has
disbarred attorneys found guilty of fraud or wilful misconduct. See, e.g., In re Hines, 275
S.C. 271, 269 S.E.2d 766 (1980); In re Shuford, 271 S.C. 304, 247 S.E.2d 323 (1978); In re
Crosland, 270 S.C. 546, 243 S.E.2d 198 (1978); In re DuPre, 270 S.C. 264, 241 S.E.2d 896
(1978). See also Annot., 96 A.L.R.2D 823 (1964)(discipline for neglect of a legal duty).
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estate transaction in which Bruner acted as counsel for the pur-
chasers and was responsible for recording the mortgage on the
property. He fulfilled this duty, but failed to forward notifica-
tion or the recorded mortgage to the seller's attorney. After sev-
eral futile requests for the document, the seller's attorney filed a
complaint against Bruner with the Board. Only then, more than
seven months after the initial transaction, did Bruner comply
with the requests. The Hearing Panel concluded that this mis-
conduct violated DR 6-101(A)(3), which prohibits an attorney
from neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.6
In August 1982 the Executive Committee had admonished
Bruner for failure to supply promptly information requested by
the Board of Grievances during an investigation. The Hearing
Panel recommended that the neglect charge and this earlier in-
fraction be treated together and a private reprimand imposed.
The Executive Committee agreed with the Panel's decision.
Affirming the Board's finding of professional misconduct,
the supreme court emphasized that attorneys are required to co-
operate fully with the Board during investigations. The court
concluded, therefore, that Bruner should be publicly repri-
manded because of his uncooperativeness and "lackadaisical at-
titude toward his duties."8
The respondent in Haddock had also received a prior warn-
ing from the Board for unresponsiveness to Board inquiries dur-
ing an investigation.9 The events leading to the neglect charge
commenced when a client contacted Haddock in 1978 concern-
ing a breach of warranty claim. Haddock filed a complaint on
the client's behalf, but failed to pursue the matter further or
respond to the client's telephone calls, letter, or notes.10 Con-
tacting Haddock was almost impossible because he did not
maintain regular office hours, a full-time office staff, or an effi-
cient way to receive mail or calls. When the client subsequently
6. 283 S.C. at 115-16, 321 S.E.2d at 600-01. See supra note 3 for text of S.C. SuP. CT.
R. 32, DR 6-101(A)(3)(Supp. 1984).
7. Id. at 116, 321 S.E.2d at 601. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8. 283 S.C. at 116, 321 S.E.2d at 601.
9. Id. at 118, 321 S.E.2d at 602. The first investigation concerned a complaint
against Haddock for failure to pay a private investigator for his services. Respondent
later paid, and the complaint was dismissed.
10. For a discussion of disciplinary proceedings arising from an attorney's failure to
communicate with his client, see Annot., 80 A.L.R.3D 1240 (1977).
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requested her file, Haddock refused to relinquish it, contending
that she owed him money for a deposition.1
Finding in Haddock's action a "lack of professionalism"
that led to the neglect of his legal duties, the court refused to
accept his inefficient office system as an excuse or justification
for his misconduct.12 Repeating an earlier holding, 3 the court
stated that the client's file belonged to her and should have been
returned upon request. The court concluded that because of the
respondent's lack of professionalism and his unresponsiveness to
the Board's inquiries and warnings, a public reprimand was
appropriate.14
The court's decisions in Bruner and Haddock serve as re-
minders that an attorney must act promptly and diligently in
serving his client's interests. Late compliance, as in Bruner, is
not satisfactory. Nor will an attorney be spared disciplinary
sanction because his office system prevented him from commu-
nicating with his client. Finally, if the Board is investigating an
allegation of misconduct, the attorney must cooperate fully with
the Board's inquiries.
Tammie E. White
II. DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEY'S COMMUNICATION WITH
VENIREMEN DESPITE IGNORANCE OF RULES AND INEXPERIENCE
In In re Rivers' 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court pub-
licly reprimanded a young attorney with no trial experience for
aiding in the communication with veniremen 6 and failing to re-
11. 283 S.C. at 117, 321 S.E.2d at 601-02.
12. Id., 321 S.E.2d at 602.
13. In re Crosland, 270 S.C. 546, 243 S.E.2d 198 (1978).
14. 283 S.C. at 118, 321 S.E.2d at 602.
15. - S.C. __, 331 S.E.2d 332 (1984).
16. DR 7-108 provides in relevant part:
(A) Before the trial of a case a lawyer connected therewith shall not com-
municate with or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to be a
member of the venire from which the jury will be selected for the trial of the
case.
(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer also apply to com-
munications with or investigations of members of a family of a veniremen or a
juror.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-108 (Supp. 1984).
1985]
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veal this misconduct to the court.17 The court's refusal to accept
ignorance of the rules as an excuse for professional misconduct
is in accord with other jurisdictions.1 "
Rivers graduated and was admitted to practice in 1976. His
legal work experience consisted of three years in the Office of the
Judge Advocate General, United States Army, and two months
as a law clerk for a circuit court judge. When Rivers began prac-
ticing law in 1983, as the partner of an established trial attorney,
he had no trial experience.19
In preparation for a civil trial, Warlick, Rivers' partner, em-
ployed an investigator to contact veniremen and ask their opin-
ion on issues relevant to the case. After assurance by Warlick
that this procedure was ethical, the investigator began work on
the project using questions that Rivers had helped draft.20
The investigator subsequently informed Warlick that two
attorneys he knew had advised him that the investigation was
unethical. Warlick stated he would take care of it, but proceeded
to use the information obtained from the investigator to select
the jury. The case, scheduled for trial in federal court, was sub-
sequently settled.21 The misconduct was discovered, however,
when a juror informed the judge that he had been contacted by
17. DR 1-102 provides in relevant part:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another ....
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 1-102 (Supp. 1984). DR 7-108 provides in relevant part:
(G) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a
venireman or a juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror, or a mem-
ber of his family, of which the lawyer has knowledge.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-108 (Supp. 1984). DR 1-103 provides in relevant part:
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to in-
vestigate or act upon such violation.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, 1-103 (Supp. 1984).
18. See State of Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Rhubalton, 132 So. 2d 395, 399
(Fla. 1961); People ex rel. Healy v. Macauley, 230 11. 208, 82 N.E. 612, 614 (1907); State
v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460, 464, 524 P.2d 747, 750-51 (1974).
19. - S.C. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 332.
20. Id. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 332.
21. Panel Report at 6.
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Disciplinary proceedings were brought against Rivers after
he had been acquitted of contempt charges in federal court.
23
The South Carolina Supreme Court restated its holding from In
re Two Anonymous Members of the South Carolina Bar24 that
attorneys are forbidden to communicate with jury members or
members of their families within the sixth degree of kinship.25
The court then held that Rivers had violated the Rules on Disci-
plinary Procedure by aiding in the contacting of jurors26 and
failing to report such misconduct.
The court acknowledged Rivers inexperience and agreed
with the Panel's finding that he was ignorant of the rules appli-
cable to jury selection in civil trials. Nevertheless, the court
stated that "[i]gnorance. . . is no excuse, '2 and held that Riv-
ers, like more experienced attorneys, had a duty to discover and
obey the rules governing the profession.2e He could not, there-
fore, avoid disciplinary sanctions. The court concluded, however,
that Rivers' "honesty, integrity and high moral character,"30 his
22. - S.C. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 332.
23. The contempt charge proceedings against Rivers' partner are reported in United
States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1984).
24. 278 S.C. 477, 298 S.E.2d 450 (1982).
25. - S.C. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 333, The court cited S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-
108(A), (F)(Supp. 1984). For text of these rules, see supra note 16.
26. The court cited Rule 5, which provides in relevant part:
Misconduct as the term is used herein means any one or more of the
following:
B. Acts or omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with any
other person or persons, which violate the attorney's Oath of Office or the Code
of Professional Responsibility as is in effect and adopted by the Court, whether
or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client
relationship.
D. Conduct tending to pollute the administration of justice or to bring the
courts or the legal professional into disrepute or conduct demonstrating unfit-
ness to practice law.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. 5(B), (D) (Supp. 1984). The court also cited S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32,
DR 7-108(A), (F), DR 1-102(A)(1), (2), (5), (6). For text of these rules, see supra notes 16
& 17.
27. The court cited S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. 5(B),(D); S.C. SUP. CT. R. 32, DR 7-
108(G), DR 1-102(A)(1), (6), DR 1-103(A). For text of these rules, see supra notes 26 &
17.
28. - S.C. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 333.
29. Id. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 333.
30. Id. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 333.
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limited involvement, and his inexperience were strong mitigating
factors and that the appropriate sanction, therefore, was a pub-
lic reprimand.3 1 The court's position in Rivers was justified; am-
ple sources existed from which the respondent could have dis-
covered the rule.3 2 The court, although citing inexperience as a
mitigating factor, explicitly rejected ignorance as an excuse, stat-
ing that the standard is the same for all attorneys. Thus, the
court dispelled any misconceptions that ignorance resulting from
inexperience would prevent the imposition of disciplinary sanc-
tions and indicated that an attorney's duty to discover, obey,
and report violations of the rules of practice and professional
responsibility commences upon entry into the profession.
Tammie E. White
III. LIMITATION ON ATTORNEY'S BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS THAT
MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT CLIENTS
The South Carolina Supreme Court held in In re Pyatt33
that absent consent after full disclosure, an attorney should not
engage in business transactions with a client if his own interests
differ from those of the client.3 4 Moreover, if he does not intend
to act as counsel for clients who consult him regarding matters
in which he has an adverse interest, the attorney must ade-
quately explain to the clients that he does not represent their
interests in the transaction.35 The court publicly reprimanded
the respondent after finding that Pyatt had violated these rules
31. Id. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 333.
32. First, S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-108 (Supp. 1984) explicitly prohibits communica-
tion with veniremen. For the text of relevant portions of DR 7-108, see supra note 17.
Second, in 1982 the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted DR 7-108 in In re Two
Anonymous Members of the South Carolina Bar, 278 S.C. 477, 298 S.E.2d 450 (1982).
The court later held in In re Holman, 277 S.C. 293, 286 S.E.2d 148 (1982), that an attor-
ney's communication with jury members warranted disbarment. Communication with ju-
rors is also prohibited during trial and limited after trial. See, e.g., In re Delgado, 279
S.C. 293, 306 S.E.2d 591 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 740 (1984). For a discussion of
Two Anonymous Members and Delgado, see Professional Responsibility, Annual Survey
of South Carolina Law, 36 S.C.L. REv. 231, 238 (1984). See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.2D 298
(1958)(communication prohibited during trial); Annot., 19 A.L.R.4TH 1209 (1983)(com-
munication prohibited after trial).
33. 280 S.C. 302, 312 S.E.2d 553 (1984).
34. Id. at 304, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
35. Id. at 303, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
[Vol. 37
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by engaging in a real estate transaction in which members of his
family purchased property from a client without prior
disclosure.36
The Marvins contacted Pyatt for advice on avoiding a
threatened mortgage foreclosure. Among other alternatives, Py-
att suggested that the Marvins sell the property to a group of
investors who would assume the mortgage, lease the property to
the Marvins, and grant them an option to repurchase at a later
date. The Marvins found this option attractive because it al-
lowed them to retain their property and, accepting Pyatt's ad-
vice, agreed to sell. Pyatt then prepared a deed and other docu-
ments necessary to transfer the property to an investor group
comprised of his wife and a business associate. Because Mrs. Py-
att used money from a joint account shared with her husband to
make the purchase, Mr. Pyatt acquired a pecuniary interest in
the transaction. 37 The Marvins did not discover until after the
closing that Mrs. Pyatt was one of the investors.38 Later, when
the property was transferred to Pyatt's brother, Pyatt prepared
the lease agreement.39 Although the leasing contract granted the
Marvins the promised right to repurchase, the lease payments
were unfavorable to them.40
When the Marvins later attempted to reacquire the prop-
erty, Pyatt explained to them that the repurchase price was
$45,700, the fair market value of the real estate.41 The term "fair
market value," although embodied in the contractual repurchase
option, had not previously been explained to the Marvins. The
investors had paid the Marvins $2,000 and assumed the existing
mortgage of $24,000. The Marvins, considering the quoted re-
purchase price unreasonable, refused to pay. When the Marvins
became delinquent in their leasing payments, Pyatt initiated
36. Id. at 304, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
37. Id. at 303, 312 S.E.2d at 554. For a discussion of disciplinary proceedings result-
ing from an attorney's direct or indirect purchase of a client's property, see Annot., 35
A.L.R.3D 674 (1971). See also Annot., 68 A.L.R.3D 967 (1976) (conflicts of interests in real
estate closings).
38. Brief of Complainant at 1-6.
39. 280 S.C. at 303, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
40. The Marvins' monthly rental payments under the lease exceeded their previous
mortgage payments by $76.00. Id.
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ejectment proceedings against them on behalf of his brother.42
Throughout their business dealings, the Marvins and Pyatt
had different perceptions of the nature of their relationship. Py-
att regarded himself as a middleman between the investors and
the Marvins, not as the Marvins' attorney.43 Pyatt contended
that the Marvins knew of his role and shared his view of the
relationship.44 Thus, he claimed, no attorney-client relationship
existed, and no ethical violation had occurred.45 Conversely, the
Marvins alleged that they believed Pyatt was their attorney and
was acting in their best interests until Pyatt revealed the repur-
chase price and commenced ejectment proceedings against
them.46 Commenting upon these conflicting perceptions, the su-
preme court admonished: "Regardless of how the respondent re-
garded the relationship, he failed to exercise proper care and
judgment in explaining to the Marvins that he did not represent
42. 280 S.C. at 303, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
43. Brief of Respondent at 5. The respondent did not regard himself as the Marvins'
attorney in part because he had advised them to seek advice from another attorney
about their financial difficulties if they pursued bankruptcy remedies. Both Pyatt and
the Marvins testified that the Marvins had sought advice from another attorney. Id.
44. Brief of Respondent at 3-6. The respondent alleged that the Marvins knew of
his adverse interest because they gained concessions from him as representative of the
investors. Id. at 4. Additionally, Pyatt stated that he told the Marvins that he was acting
on behalf of the investors and that the Marvins were capable of understanding the trans-
action. Panel Report at 3. Therefore, he contended that the mere failure to put the dis-
claimer in writing did not create an ethical violation warranting the recommended sanc-
tion. Brief of Respondent at 6. As further support for his contention that no attorney-
client relationship existed, the respondent pointed out that no written agreement or fee
arrangement was made. Id. at 5. Citing 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 169 (1980), the
respondent conceded that a relationship may be implied from the conduct of the parties,
but stated that a lack of formalities is some evidence that no attorney-client relationship
was formed.
45. The respondent relied on In re Palmieri, 76 N.J. 51, 385 A.2d 856 (1978). In that
case, Palmieri's former clients, who were business persons, agreed to make substantial
loans to his corporation, which had been created to build a resort hotel. The court held
that no attorney-client relationship existed and the transactions were merely part of a
joint business venture. Therefore, no ethical violation existed. The court reasoned that
the clients were sophisticated business persons who did not rely on Palmieri as an attor-
ney in making the investment. Id. at 60, 385 A.2d at 860. The New Jersey Supreme
Court summarized its conclusion: "Before a professional obligation is created, there must
be some act, some word, some identifiable manifestation that the reliance on the attor-
ney is in his professional capacity." Id. But cf. In re Hurd, 69 N.J. 316, 354 A.2d 78
(1976)(stating that even when the parties are not in the position of attorney and client, a
member of the bar owes a fiduciary duty to those he knows or should know are relying
on him for professional advice).
46. Brief of Complainant at 9.
8




The court concluded that Pyatt had violated DR 5-101(A)
48
and DR 5-104(A)49 of the South Carolina Supreme Court Rules
on Disciplinary Procedure which prohibit an attorney from en-
gaging in business dealings with a client unless the client con-
sents after full disclosure of any adverse interest. As a result, the
court adopted the sanction recommended by the Hearing Panel:
a public reprimand conditioned on reconveyance of the property
to the Marvins. 50 Rejecting the defenses raised by Pyatt, 1 the
court stated that the Marvins had been "looking to the respon-
dent to represent their interests" and Pyatt had failed to explain
adequately to them that he did not.
5 2
This opinion indicates that the court will rely on the reason-
able expectations of the potential client in deciding whether an
attorney-client relationship exists.53 While courts in other juris-
dictions have held that once the relationship is established, the
prohibition in DR 5-101(A) imposes a burden on the attorney to
demonstrate that the resulting transaction is equitable to the
client,54 the South Carolina Supreme Court did not explicitly
adopt this rule. The court did point out, however, that the
Marvins' interests were not adequately protected by the agree-
47. 280 S.C. at 303, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
48. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 5-101(A)(Supp. 1984) provides: "Except with the consent
of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of
his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by
his own financial, business, property, or personal interests."
49. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 5-104(A)(Supp. 1984) provides: "A lawyer shall not enter
into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the
client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection
of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure."
50. 280 S.C. at 304, 312 S.E.2d at 554. The court stipulated that if the respondent
failed to reconvey the property within thirty days of the order, he would be indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law. Id.
51. See supra notes 44 & 45.
52. 280 S.C. at 303, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
53. See supra notes 44 & 45 for respondent's discussion on this issue. The attorney-
client relationship is generally a matter of contract. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of Ala-
bama State Bar v. Jones, 291 Ala. 371, 377, 281 So. 2d 267, 273 (1973). The relationship
may, however, be implied from the conduct of the parties. See, e.g., Nicholson v.
Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 277, 64 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1951).
54. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interests in the Legal Profession,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1244, 1287 (1981). See also Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L.
REv. 807, 815-20 (1977).
1985]
9
et al.: Professional Responsibility
Published by Scholar Commons, 1985
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ments drafted by Pyatt 5 As counsel for both the buyers and the
sellers, Pyatt placed himself on both sides of the transaction.
Some commentators have suggested that because such dual rep-
resentation necessarily produces a conflict of interest, an attor-
ney should never attempt to represent both parties.5 6
Pursuant to DR 5-10157 and DR 5-105, 5 Pyatt should have
refused the employment unless he had a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that neither his own interests nor the interests of third
parties would adversely affect his representation of his clients.
Both Pyatt's family ties with the investors and his probable
awareness of the normal conflicts that arise between bargaining
parties make it difficult to conclude that he reasonably believed
representation was proper. In situations where the conflicts are
less severe, an attorney may avoid problems by fully disclosing
any adverse interest and obtaining the client's consent to the
representation. As indicated in Pyatt, the nature of the conflict-
ing interests and the attorney-client relationship must be ade-
quately explained; the client's and the attorney's perceptions of
the resulting relationship must coincide. Furthermore, the attor-
ney should obtain some objective proof that disclosure was
made. Absent proof of sufficient explanation by the attorney, the
client's perception of the resulting relationship will determine
whether disciplinary sanctions are appropriate.
Tammie E. White
55. 280 S.C. at 303-04, 312 S.E.2d at 554.
56. See generally Comment, Conflicts of Interest In Real Estate Transactions:
Dual Representation - Lawyers Stretching the Rules, 6 W. Naw ENG. L. REv. 73 (1983).
57. For text of DR 5-101, see supra note 48.
58. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 5-105(A)(Supp. 1984) provides: "A lawyer shall decline
proferred employment if the exercise of his independent judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except
to the extent permitted under 5-105(C)."
202 [Vol. 37
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